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People are more accurate at recognizing faces of individuals of their own race than 
individuals of another race; this well-replicated phenomenon is known as the cross-race 
effect (CRE). The reasons underlying the CRE are not clear; research indicates that 
expertise with own- versus cross-race faces may play a role, but there is also evidence 
that social categorization is a factor. Two experiments examine the roles of expertise and 
categorization by comparing the effects of cross-race faces to novel stimuli (Experiment 
1) and rival university members (Experiment 2). Experiment 1 used inversion as a test of 
expertise and holistic processing to compare White faces, Black faces, and Greebles. In 
addition, the EZ Diffusion model was utilized to gather insight into the components 
underlying the differences in accuracy and reaction time. Results indicate that, for most 
measures, Black faces shared more similarities with Greebles than White faces, pointing 
to a strong component of expertise in the CRE. In Experiment 2, upright and inverted 
images of White and Black males were identified as members of the participants’ own or 
rival university. Again, the EZ Diffusion model was applied to the results.  A cross-race 
effect was found, but contrary to work by other researchers, no cross-university effect 
was detected, again indicating that expertise, rather than categorization, is a critical factor 
in the CRE.  The results are discussed within the context of models that incorporate both 
perceptual expertise and social categorization, as well as how factors such as saliency 






In 1987, a Black man entered a Tulsa laundromat and attacked an employee, 
Cyndi Doe1, a twenty-year-old White woman. She was tied up and locked in the 
restroom. Eventually, the man returned to the restroom, carried Ms. Doe to a car, then 
drove to another location and raped her.  
Four months later, Cyndi Doe was presented with a five-man photographic array 
and asked if her attacker was among the images. Cyndi Doe identified Mr. Arvin McGee, 
who was subsequently prosecuted.  During the trial, it was revealed that Ms. Doe had 
been inconsistent in her description of the man that attacked her, and, in an earlier 
photographic lineup, had previously picked out a different man. In addition, the defense 
presented evidence that Arvin McGee was injured at the time the crime was committed 
and would have been physically unable to carry a person from a building to a car. In spite 
of these discrepancies, Mr. McGee was eventually convicted and sentenced to 298 years.2 
He served almost thirteen of those years before DNA evidence proved his innocence and 
identified the true perpetrator of the crime, Oklahoma inmate Edward Alberty  (“Know 
the cases: Arvin McGee,” n.d.). Attempts in 2002 to prosecute Mr. Alberty for this crime 
failed; the statute of limitations had passed. Edward Alberty was released from prison in 
2004. He was arrested again in 2007 for theft, and sentenced to 15 years after pleading 
guilty to five felony charges (Braun, 2007).  He is up for parole in April of 2013 
(“Oklahoma Department of Corrections: Offender lookup,” n.d.). 
                                                
1 Cyndi Doe is not the victim’s real name. 
2 A mistrial was declared for Alvin McGee’s first trial, and the second trial resulted in a hung jury. At his 
2 A mistrial was declared for Alvin McGee’s first trial, and the second trial resulted in a hung jury. At his 
third trial, he was found guilty of robbery, kidnapping, forcible sodomy, and rape. The final sentence of 
298 years was a reduction of his original sentence.   
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Cyndi Doe made a mistake. She looked at several photographs and pointed at the 
one that best matched her memory of the man that attacked her, and Arvin McGee paid 
for this error with 13 years of his life. The case of Arvin McGee is far from unique; 
experts have long known that eyewitnesses are often mistaken and that memories are 
imperfect and easily altered (Münsterberg, 1909; Borchard & Lutz, 1932; Cutler & 
Penrod, 1995).   
The importance of the identification and testimony of mistaken eyewitnesses has 
increasingly gained attention, due in large part to The Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org), a non-profit legal clinic based in New York. This 
organization, affiliated with the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University, 
uses DNA evidence to exonerate wrongly convicted individuals. As of May 2012, there 
have been 289 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States, 222 of which 
have been since 2000.  On average, those exonerated had served 13.5 years, and 17 had 
been sentenced to death before their innocence was established and they were released.    
While there are a number of important contributing factors to wrongful 
conviction, such as improper forensics, false confessions, government and/or forensic 
science misconduct, poor legal representation, and the testimony of dishonest informants, 
eyewitness misidentification is, by far, the greatest factor in wrongful convictions. Faulty 
eyewitness identification was a factor in the conviction of over 75% of the individuals 
that were subsequently exonerated through DNA evidence ("Understand the causes: 
Eyewitness misidentification," n.d.). 
As demonstrated by the case of Mr. McGee, the mistaken eyewitness 
identification presents a serious dilemma in the legal world (Brigham, 1989; Leippe, 
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1995; Chance & Goldstein, 1996; Brigham, Wasserman, & Meissner, 1999; Lindsay, 
Brigham, Elizabeth Brimacombe, & Wells, 2004).  Eyewitness identification is a critical 
component of finding, arresting, and convicting alleged perpetrators of a crime 
(Devenport, Penrod, & Cutler, 1997; Lindsay, et al., 2004). In spite of the well-
established fallibility of eyewitness memory (Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 
1982; Penrod, Loftus, & Winkler, 1982; Cutler & Penrod, 1995), the testimony given in 
court by eyewitnesses tends to have great influence. Eyewitnesses generally believe their 
recollection to be accurate, as do the members of the jury (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983; 
Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988; Lindsay, Wells, & O'Connor, 1989; Cutler, Penrod, & 
Dexter, 1990; Sporer, 2001a; Flowe, Mehta, & Ebbesen, 2011).  
In the criminal justice system, numerous factors have been identified as 
contributing to mistaken eyewitness identification. Researchers often categorize the 
factors as either system variables, those factors that are within the control of the criminal 
justice system, or estimator variables, which are beyond the influence or control of the 
individuals or processes of the criminal justice system (Wells, 1978).  
System variables include such factors as the interval between crime and 
identification, interrogation style, and composition and presentation of the lineup.  The 
manner of questioning (i.e., the use of suggestive questioning, question bias, and open-
ended or unstructured interviews vs. leading or structured interview), whether the lineup 
photographs are presented simultaneously or sequentially, the selection of ‘fillers’ 
(members of a photo array that are not considered suspects), instructions to the 
eyewitness, and the reaction by the lineup administrator(s) to the witness’s selection may 
affect the identification made by the eyewitness, as well as the witness’s confidence in 
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the selection (Wells, 1978; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). The memory of the witness can be 
altered, whereby the image of the person s/he selected from the lineup essentially 
replaces the face of the actual perpetrator in the witness’s mind.  When the latter occurs, 
the witness may have complete confidence in the memory; with a very clear mental 
image of the culprit, when, in fact, the image is of the person seen in a lineup, rather than 
the actual perpetrator of the crime (Wells & Loftus, 2007). 
In part, Mr. McGee’s wrongful conviction was due to variables that were under 
the control of the criminal justice system. According to a letter from R. Thomas 
Seymour, Ms. Doe’s attorney, to Alan Jackere, the prosecuting attorney in Mr. McGee’s 
case (2006), Cyndi Doe was presented with a lineup of five individuals, four of whom 
lacked any resemblance to her description of her attacker.  The city of Tulsa had no 
policy on assembling a fair lineup, and the men included in the array varied greatly in 
terms of complexion, age, build, and facial hair. Only one man included in the array 
matched Ms. Doe’s memory: Alvin McGee. In addition, the detective in charge of the 
case admitted that Cyndi Doe was led to believe that her attacker was included in the 
photos in presented to her. Also, Cyndi Doe asked repeatedly to hear the voice of the 
suspect; that memory was very strong. Her request was refused3. Whether done 
intentionally or unintentionally, several decisions and actions made by police officers 
influenced Cyndi Doe to identify Alvin McGee, and, as the lead detective in the case 
admitted during the trial, this identification was the only direct evidence the prosecution 
had against Mr. McGee. 
                                                
3 When, some 15 years later, DNA evidence identified Edward Alberty as her assailant, Ms. Doe claimed 
that upon hearing his voice, she immediately recognized it as the voice of the man who had kidnapped and 
raped her.  
 
 5 
The conduct of the police may have distorted Cyndi Doe’s memory of her 
attacker’s face, but it is possible that it was not all that clear in the first place. Research 
indicates that recognition accuracy decreases under conditions of negative arousal 
(Deffenbacher, 1984; Shapiro & Penrod, 1986; MacLin, MacLin, & Malpass, 2001). The 
trauma of the experience could have negatively impacted her ability to remember her 
attacker. This potential factor is an example of an estimator variable, a variable that is not 
under the control of the criminal justice system. Estimator variables are often related to 
the circumstances of the crime, such as the presence of a weapon (referred to as weapon 
focus) (Loftus, 1979; Steblay, 1992), and factors that affect visibility, such as lighting or 
distance, which can affect how well the witness is able to encode, store, and retrieve the 
memory of the perpetrator (Wells, 1978; Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Wells, Wright, & 
Bradfield, 1999).  
According to the Innocence Project, one of the most important variables in 
eyewitness misidentification is race: the race of the victim and of the perpetrator, and 
whether they are the same or different. Of the 289 DNA exonerees, 62% are African 
American, Caucasians comprise 28% of the cases, and about 7% are Latino.  Cross-race 
identifications constitute at least 40% of the cases in which mistaken eyewitness 
identification played a role. Two-thirds of exoneration cases for the Innocence Project are 
cross-race cases of sexual assault; in contrast, cross-race sexual assaults comprise only 
15% of all rapes in United States ("Facts on post-conviction DNA exonerations," n.d.). 
According to Peter Neufeld, the co-director of the Innocence Project, several factors play 
a role in this large discrepancy, including, “a long history of the American criminal 
justice system treating the rape of a White woman by a Black man as a particularly vile 
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crime. One consequence of treating such crimes with particular zeal is that people of 
color will be wrongfully convicted more frequently,” (Patton, 2009). In addition, the 
socioeconomic status of many of the accused may impede their ability to hire adequate 
legal assistance.  
Systemic racial bias may have played a role in the case of Arvin McGee. In 2006, 
Arvin McGee Jr. was awarded $12.25 million in a wrongful conviction lawsuit, which 
claimed that the Tulsa police acted with “deliberate indifference” in the manner in which 
they conducted the photographic lineup. It was established that the lineup was biased; 
under cross-examination, the lead detective, a White male, admitted that Edward Alberty 
and Arvin McGee were so similar that they could be brothers ("Tulsa to Settle Wrongful 
Conviction Suit," 2006), though mug shots of Alberty and McGee, taken in 2002 and 
2001, respectively, do not appear to show an uncanny resemblance between the two men 
(see Figure 1). If Cyndi Doe and her attacker were the same race, would she have been 
able to see beyond the similarity in age and facial hair and recognize that her attacker was 
not included in the array, or at least felt sufficient doubt as to declare that she did not 
know? This question is unanswerable, but research demonstrates that an eyewitness to a 
crime will tend to be less accurate in identifying the perpetrator of a crime if the witness 
and the perpetrator are not the same race; this phenomenon is part of what is known as 
the cross-race effect. In this sense, race is an estimator variable; the witness’s memory is 
impacted by the difference in race. Like many of the men that have been exonerated by 
the Innocence Project, the cross-race effect appears to have been an important factor in 





Figure 1. Oklahoma Department of Corrections: Edward Alberty, 2002 (left) and Arvin 
McGee, 2001 (right).  
 
The cross-race effect (CRE, also known as own-race-bias) refers to the ability of 
people to more readily distinguish and accurately recognize faces of their own race than 
faces of individuals from another race. The CRE is remarkably robust (Yarmey & Jones, 
1983; Chance & Goldstein, 1996), having been replicated numerous times and across a 
variety of conditions (Bothwell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; 
Brigham, 2008). While the majority of the studies in this area have examined the cross-
race effect for Black and White participants and were conducted in North America 
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 
1975), the CRE has been replicated in several countries and across different racial and 
ethnic groups, including Asian and White (Ng & Lindsay, 1994), Germans viewing 
Turkish faces, (Sporer, 1999), Mexican American, White, and Black (Platz & Hosch, 
1988), Hispanic and Black (MacLin, et al., 2001), Canadian First Nation and White 
(Jackiw, Arbuthnott, Pfeifer, Marcon, & Meissner, 2008), Whites and Blacks from South 
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Africa and England (Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2001; Chiroro, Tredoux, Radaelli, & 
Meissner, 2008), Jewish and Arab (Weimann, Fishman, & Rattner, 1986; Rattner & 
Fishman, 1998), and the Tswana and Pedi of South Africa (Coetzee, Greeff, Barrett, & 
Henzi, 2009). 
Ideally, cross-race studies include participants of both races tested on both sets of 
stimuli (for example, Black and White participants presented with Black and White 
faces), rather than just one group tested on both sets of stimuli (e.g., White participants 
presented with Black and White faces (Bothwell, et al., 1989; Slone, Brigham, & 
Meissner, 2000; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer, 2001b). It is only under these 
circumstances that a complete cross-over interaction (whereby performance by White 
participants is worse for Black faces and performance of Black participants is worse for 
White faces), can possibly be identified and fully examined (Lindsay & Wells, 1983; 
Sporer, 2001b, 2001a). However, the availability of minority participants is often an 
issue, as it was for the research presented here, and many studies include only one 
racially or ethnically homogeneous group of participants.  In studies that include both 
White and Black participants, a cross-over interaction is reliably found, though there has 
been some inconsistency in the results of meta-analyses as to whether the magnitude of 
the CRE tends to be the same for Black and White participants (Sporer, 2001b). 
Bothwell, Brigham, and Malpass (1989) found that the CRE was approximately the same 
across groups, but other meta-analyses found that White participants tended to exhibit a 
greater CRE than Black participants; while Black participants were less accurate in 
identifying White faces versus Black faces, White participants were even worse at 
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identifying Black faces versus White faces, (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001).  
A meta-analysis of 30 years of research on this phenomenon (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001) found that own-race identifications were 1.4 times more likely to be 
correct than cross-race identifications. In addition, mistaken identifications were 1.56 
times more likely when the stimulus face was of another race than when it was the same 
race as the participant.  Comparing the studies across time, the researchers found that 
measures of overall cross-race identification accuracy (A’, d’), as well as the proportion 
of correct positive identifications, or ‘hits,’ had increased in more recent years. However, 
the proportion of ‘false alarms,’ or incorrect identifications when the face was not 
present, had also increased.  This trend may be due to a shifting response criterion; 
participants with a liberal response criterion tend to respond that a face has been seen 
before, whereas those with a conservative response criterion will expend the time and 
effort to arrive at a greater level of internal certainty before indicating that a face had 
been presented previously. The meta-analysis found a significant cross race effect for 
response criterion in that participants were more likely to have a liberal response criterion 
with cross-race faces than when the face was of someone of their own race. There are 
several possible contributing factors to a liberal response criterion, including an overall 
lower concern regarding accuracy and/or a sense that extra effort will not necessarily help 
in terms of achieving greater accuracy. However, the tendency to default to making a 
positive identification rather than a negative identification (declaring that the face had not 
been seen previously) has serious repercussions when considering the real-life 
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implications of an eyewitness who is too willing to identify someone in spite of 
uncertainty or a poor memory (Wells & Loftus, 2007).  
The consequences of the CRE can range from devastating, as exemplified by the 
case of Arvin McGee, to socially awkward. An individual that wrongly identifies or fails 
to recognize a person of a different race may feel embarrassed or judged by others as 
prejudiced. The person that is misidentified could interpret the lack of recognition as a 
racially induced slight or insult, and may feel discounted and stereotyped (Hugenberg, 
Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010).  Future interactions could well be negatively 
impacted by incidents of cross-race misidentification; perhaps even the intuitive 
knowledge that we tend to recognize individuals of a different race less well inhibits 
interaction in the first place (Brigham, 2008). Studies have demonstrated that individuals 
with developmental prosopagnosia (or ‘face blindness’, a condition characterized by 
severe difficulty in recognizing familiar faces) often prefer to avoid social interaction due 
to feelings of embarrassment and anxiety about offending others due the inability to 
recognize people (Kress & Daum, 2003; Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & 
Nakayama, 2008). Even mild prosopagnosia can hamper social interaction and may 
contribute to higher levels of shyness or social phobia: in one study, compared to non-shy 
peers, shy children were less accurate in facial discrimination, but only when faces 
differed in the spacing of features; there were no significant differences for faces that had 
different sets of eyes and mouths, or for faces that differed in the shape of external 
contour (Anzures, Quinn, Pascalis, Slater, & Kang, 2009). If it can be said that we tend to 
suffer from some degree of prosopagnosia for cross-race faces, when we are also acutely 
aware of the importance of the face and interpersonal recognition in terms of facilitating 
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social interaction (Ellis, 1990), the cross-race effect may be, in part, a self-perpetuating 
deficit.  
In spite of decades of research and relatively consistent findings for a CRE, there 
is not a definitive answer to why it occurs (Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). In general, 
there are two main theoretical explanations that underlie the proposed factors of the CRE; 
the perceptual expertise model or a model based on social-cognitive influences. Various 
mechanisms have been proposed, including group disparities in facial similarity 
(Goldstein & Chance, 1976, 1978; Chiroro, et al., 2008), categorization of cross-race 
members (Levin, 1996, 2000; MacLin & Malpass, 2001), the effect of attitudes and level 
of contact (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003), a lack of 
expertise for cross-race faces (Carey, 1992; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 
2000; Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler, 2006; Stahl, Wiese, & Schweinberger, 2008; Heron-
Delaney et al., 2011) and the use of different cognitive processes (Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, 
& Tan, 1989; Rhodes, et al., 2006; Greenberg & Goshen-Gottstein, 2009; Michel, 
Corneille, & Rossion, 2010; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011). Although many 
researchers may tend to favor one model over another, these proposed bases for the CRE 
are not considered mutually exclusive; recent models (Sporer, 2001b; Susa, Meissner, & 
de Heer, 2010) combine perceptual as well as social-cognitive components of the cross-
race effect.   
One of the earliest proposals, that there are between-group differences in 
physiognomic homogeneity, has not been supported (Chance, et al., 1975; Goldstein & 
Chance, 1976, 1978, 1979). Japanese faces, for example, have not been found to be 
quantifiably more similar to each other in terms of facial features than White faces, and 
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there were no differences in homogeneity for Black faces when compared to White or 
Japanese faces (Goldstein, 1979). Also, given that the CRE commonly occurs, at least to 
some extent, for both groups of participants (i.e., both groups perform better with same 
race faces), and that the CRE has been found even when the categories of race were 
artificially projected on ambiguous race faces (MacLin & Malpass, 2001; Corneille, 
Huart, Becquart, & Brédart, 2004) differences in racial physiognomic variance do not 
provide a sufficient explanation.  
A participant’s classification of a face into racial category, and not the face itself, 
can lead to errors in memory that contribute to the CRE. If a person holds beliefs or 
attitudes about a group of people, the categorization of a face into that group may 
interfere with processing of that face as an individual person. There is evidence that 
memory for cross-race faces may be affected by the viewer’s facial schema of the racial 
or ethnic category.  Using prototypical faces from two distinct racial categories, 
Corneille, Huart, Becquart, and Brédart (2004) created several continua of mixed race 
faces. For example, an Asian face and a Caucasian face were used to create one set of 
morphed faces, and a North African and a Caucasian face were used to create another. At 
encoding, participants viewed faces from various locations on the continuum (for 
example, a face derived 50% from the Asian face and 50% from the Caucasian face). 
Subsequent testing, in which the target face was presented with foils from other locations 
of the same continuum, found that moderately ambiguous faces (30% and 70%) were 
often remembered as being closer to the racial source face than they actually were. This 
phenomenon has also been demonstrated for racially ambiguous Caucasian/Hispanic 
faces (MacLin & Malpass, 2001). Such a distortion in memory towards a racial prototype 
 
 13 
points to a tendency to endow faces with features deemed to be typical of a category. 
This type of shift in memory is regarded as one possible factor in the CRE. 
On the other hand, a portion of CRE research involves simple in-group/out-group 
categorization for which there are no identifiable facial prototypes. When participants 
were presented with photos of students designated either as from the participant’s or a 
rival university, ‘fellow’ students were more accurately recognized at test than the 
‘rivals’ (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). In reality, the photos were of people 
from neither university, and the presentation of a face as belonging to the in-group or out-
group varied between participants. In this case, faces of out-group members were not 
recognized as well as faces of in-group members, even when the stimuli were arbitrarily 
assigned to one group or the other. As such, distortions of memory towards a prototype 
cannot explain the differences in memory accuracy between the facial categories; rather, 
in-group membership may enhance memorability, whereas out-group membership may 
weaken it.  
Possible explanations include attentional differences at encoding and/or test: 
participants may pay more attention to the faces of their perceived allies because the 
ability to recognize them at a later time is somehow advantageous. Moreover, future 
interactions with in-group members are considered to be more likely than with out-group 
members, thereby increasing the chance of an opportunity or need for facial recognition 
(Harvey, Yarkin, Lightner, & Town, 1980). Researchers have proposed that strong 
negative attitudes towards out-group members could lead to a greater CRE, but this has 
not borne out; in general, there is not a significant relationship between attitude about a 
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group and facial recognition ability for members of that group (Lavrakas, Buri, & 
Mayzner, 1976; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Yarmey, 1979).  
Alternatively, but leading to similar results, is the idea that people have limited 
cognitive resources, and the tendency to discount or prejudge an out-group member is 
simply one of the many cognitive short-cuts that people utilize. Out-group members are 
categorized, whereas in-group members are individuated. This is referred to as cognitive 
disregard (Rodin, 1987), and has been demonstrated for age (Wright & Stroud, 2002; 
Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006), gender (Wright & Sladden, 2003; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006; 
Zhao & Bentin, 2008), and attractiveness (Cross, et al., 1971).  This tendency is well 
studied in personality and social psychology; research consistently demonstrates two 
strong effects in the study of intergroup perception. First, in-group members are 
perceived more positively than out-group members, and second, in terms of beliefs and 
attitudes, out-group members are judged to be more homogeneous than in-group 
members. The latter is referred to as the out-group homogeneity effect, and it occurs 
whether group membership is real or artificially created, though the effect is diminished 
for laboratory-created groups (Mullen & Hu, 1989). 
Disregard cues depend on the situation, not on the category per se. For example, 
Rodin (1987) found that while young people are better at recognizing same-age faces 
than middle-aged or elderly faces, elderly participants did not show a similar lack of 
ability to recognize young faces. According to the theory, this interaction is due to a 
difference in cognitive disregard; young people are likely to discount the middle-aged 
and elderly as unimportant, whereas older people do not demonstrate the same cognitive 
disregard for younger people.  
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Consistent with the idea of categorization and cognitive disregard, Levin (2000) 
found that the White participants who were quickest to categorize the photos of African 
Americans as Black were found to be less accurate in subsequently recognizing Black 
faces. Cognitive disregard can also potentially explain the typically asymmetrical 
interaction of many cross-race studies: while it is true that same-race identification is 
better than cross-race, White participants are typically worse at recognizing or identifying 
members of the other race/ethnicity (Asian, African American, Hispanic) than the 
minority groups are at recognizing Caucasian faces. As the majority population in the 
United States, White people may be generally associated with power, opportunity, and 
the possibility of a beneficial interaction.  As such, it may be prove to be more useful for 
minority members to expend the energy to individuate, rather than categorize, White 
people (Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010).  It is plausible, too, that, individual members of 
minority populations will have, on average, more interactions with White people than a 
White person will have with a specific minority. For example, an African American, 
across her lifetime, may interact more frequently with White people compared to a White 
woman’s interactions with African Americans (Harvey, et al., 1980). 
A recent test of predictions based on ideas underlying the concept of cognitive 
disregard produced interesting results:  the CRE for White participants viewing Black 
faces was eliminated when the photos depicted angry Black faces (Ackerman et al., 
2006). Furthermore, when attentional resources were limited, the White participants 
actually exhibited greater accuracy for angry Black faces than angry White faces. The 
finding can be interpreted as a switching off of cognitive disregard when the situation 
alters the relative importance of the pictured individual. However, the authors note that 
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categorization and individuation are not mutually exclusive; both can occur, resulting in a 
curious paradox of increased stereotypical assessments about members of an out-group 
along with improved recognition ability (Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, & Muller, 2005; 
Ackerman, et al., 2006) 
 Some researchers hypothesize that the CRE is due, in part, to a deficit in 
perceptual memory expertise for cross-race faces as compared to same-race faces 
(Chance, et al., 1975; Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Chance & 
Goldstein, 1996). The relatively constant exposure to same-race faces leads to an 
increased ability to focus on the features that are most useful for distinguishing between 
individual faces within that group, but these features differ between different racial and 
ethnic groups. This direction of thought is supported by findings that facial features that 
are generally used to describe or identify a face vary between racial groups; a study by 
Ellis, Deregowski, and Shepherd (1975) compared the facial descriptions provided by 
Black Africans and White Scottish participants. While the White participants were more 
likely to mention hair color, hair texture, and eye color, the Black participants included 
descriptions of ears, eye size, hairstyle, chin, face shape, eyebrows, and the nose/nostrils. 
Chance, Turner, & Goldstein (1982) posit that children develop a face schemata 
as a result of frequent contact with (same-race) faces, and this allows for fast and accurate 
processing. Because the relative amount of exposure to other-race faces is often far less, 
expertise does not develop to the same degree, and the face schemata that facilitates 
processing for same-race faces does not function well for cross-race faces. Same-race 
facial recognition in children improves at a greater rate than cross-race facial recognition: 
in a cross-sectional study on White participants ranging in age from six to 20, found that 
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for the youngest participants, there were no significant differences in recognition 
accuracy of a White versus and Asian faces, but that the older participants did exhibit the 
cross-race effect.   
If the CRE is due to expertise that develops as a result of the differential between 
day-to-day exposure to same- versus other-race faces, it follows that if a person does 
have a great deal of cross-race interaction, that individual should become an expert in 
cross-race faces as well, and the cross-race effect should decrease. The contact 
hypothesis, which states that increased contact with the other group will improve cross-
race recognition ability, has some support in the literature, though it is far from universal 
(Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978). It was found that children and adolescents from integrated 
neighborhoods exhibited better cross-race facial recognition than children and 
adolescents from segregated neighborhoods (Cross, et al., 1971; Feinman & Entwisle, 
1976). Some research has indicated the reverse; increased contact is associated with 
worse cross-race facial recognition ability: in a study by Lavarkas, Buri, & Mayzner 
(1976), White students that attended a predominately Black high school tended to 
demonstrate a greater cross-race deficit than White students attending a predominately 
White high school. Other research found no significant effects:  an early study by 
Brigham and Barkowitz (1978) did not find a relationship between level of interracial 
contact and recognition ability, nor did Malpass & Kravitz (1969). 
In order to test the effect of differential contact on three, rather than two, racial 
groups, Chance, Goldstein, and McBride (1975) presented Black and White participants 
with three sets of faces: White, Black and Japanese. The authors pointed out that, in one 
respect at least, Black faces are more physically homogenous than White faces: Black 
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people have dark hair. The Japanese faces, like the Black faces, all had dark hair; if 
variety in hair color was boosting the recognition accuracy of White participants for 
White faces, then Japanese faces and Black faces should be recognized at about the same 
level. Also, the authors suggested that, due to the dark skin of Black faces, details are less 
easy to distinguish. If dark versus light skin was a major factor in the CRE, Japanese 
faces, similar in tone to White faces, should be recognized with higher accuracy than 
Black faces for White participants. However, given the lack of contact for both groups of 
participants with Japanese people, if differential experience was responsible for the CRE, 
recognition accuracy would be the lowest for the Japanese faces for both Black and 
White participants. The researchers found a CRE for both groups of participants: White 
performed better with White faces, and Blacks performed better with Black faces. 
Compared to the other sets of stimuli, recognition accuracy for the Japanese faces was the 
lowest for both White and Black participants.  
Some studies show that the quality, not quantity, of cross–race contact is the more 
critical factor in reducing the CRE (Brigham & Malpass, 1985). Rather than mere level of 
contact, some researchers have examined the idea that it is the need to differentiate 
between people of another race that leads to a decrease in the cross-race effect 
(Valentine, Chiroro, & Dixon, 1995). Based on the idea that, in order to follow 
professional basketball, White basketball fans would need to differentiate between 
players, 75% of whom are Black, Dunning, Li, and Malpass (1998) compared White 
basketball fans to White participants that did not watch NBA basketball (“novices”), and 
found that the White fans did exhibit better facial recognition for Black faces than the 
White “novices”. However, a later study on CRE of basketball fans versus novices by 
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MacLin, MacLin, Van Sickler, and Li (2004) failed to replicate this aspect of the 
Dunning et al. (1998) study.   
Following the idea that differentiation leads to expertise, which leads to a better 
cross-race facial recognition, researchers have examined whether or not 
prejudicial/negative beliefs about members of another race are associated with a higher 
CRE.  Early studies seemed to indicate that there was some relationship between memory 
performance for cross-race faces and level of prejudice or attitudes about individuals of 
another race (Allport & Kramer, 1946), but more recent studies have not found any 
relationship (Lavrakas, et al., 1976; Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Slone, et al., 2000). 
However, prejudicial attitudes are related to interracial contact (see Meissner & Brigham, 
2001, for a review).  
When discussing how faces are processed, researchers in the field of facial 
recognition tend to distinguish between featural processing and configural processing 
(Carey & Diamond, 1977; Farah, Tanaka, & Drain, 1995; Greenberg & Goshen-
Gottstein, 2009). Featural processing involves the use of individual facial features or 
parts, such as the nose or eyes. Each feature is treated separately, and not considered in 
relation to the other parts of the face. Configural or holistic processing utilizes the face as 
a whole, its size and shape, and the angles and distances between the features. In this type 
of processing, many characteristics of the faces are incorporated at once. It bears noting 
that there is not a true consensus as to what is meant by configural processing, and not all 
researchers equate the terms “holistic” and “configural,” (Mondloch et al., 2010), but in 
general, and for this paper, the terms are used interchangeably in contrast with featural 
processing. Studies in the development of facial recognition indicate that as a child 
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develops expertise in facial recognition, the process is increasingly governed by a 
holistic, rather than featural, process (Carey, Diamond, & Woods, 1980). However, both 
processes are generally considered to be important in accurate facial recognition 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986). 
Yin (1969) developed an inversion paradigm for examining the process of facial 
recognition. In the original inversion task, a mixed array of upright and inverted faces or 
objects is presented to the viewer. At test, the stimuli are presented either right-side up or 
upside-down (in Yin’s method, the encoding and presentation orientation were the same), 
and the participant is asked whether the stimulus was included in the previous 
presentation (old) or not (new). The accuracy or latency difference in performance 
between the upright and inverted test stimuli is the inversion deficit.  In this two-choice 
recognition task, Yin found that inverted faces suffered a greater recognition deficit than 
other inverted objects, such as houses. According to Yin, this indicated that faces are 
processed primarily holistically, and that inversion disturbs this. On the other hand, 
specific features help us to recognize a house, and such features can still be identified 
when the stimulus is presented upside-down. Inversion at test (or at presentation and test 
(Valentine, 1988) eliminates the recognition advantage that faces carry and leads to 
processing that is not as efficient or accurate (i.e., carried out piecemeal or featurally).  
While Yin and other researchers (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) contend that 
these and other findings indicate that faces are special and processed in a way unlike any 
other stimuli, others (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Farah, Wilson, 
Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & Tanaka, 1998) have found evidence 
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that expertise in other types of visual stimuli (for example, birds for a birdwatcher) evoke 
the same sort of holistic processing, which tends to be highly accurate and efficient.    
Inversion experiments used to examine the CRE indicate that cross-race faces are 
not processed holistically, as they do not suffer the same inversion effect (decrease in 
recognition accuracy) as same race faces (Valentine, 1988; Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & 
Eberhardt, 2001; MacLin, et al., 2004; Rhodes, et al., 2006; Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; 
Michel, et al., 2010). For example, White European participants suffered a greater 
inversion deficit for White faces than Chinese faces, whereas Chinese participants had a 
larger inversion deficit for Chinese faces. Same-race faces exhibited greater susceptibility 
to inversion in terms of accuracy and reaction time (Rhodes, et al., 1989). This indicates 
that people are experts in recognizing same-race faces, but this expertise is reduced for 
cross-race faces.  
Neuroimaging studies indicate that an area in the fusifrom gyrus (often referred to 
as the fusiform face area or FFA) is particularly important in facial recognition 
(Kanwisher, et al., 1997; Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004). Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, 
& Eberhardt (2001) found that activation in this area was not as strong for participants 
viewing cross-race faces as for same-race faces, but the difference in activation varied 
between participants. In a subsequent recognition task, the CRE was bigger for those 
participants that had previously demonstrated the greatest difference in brain activation 
for same- versus cross-race faces. 
If expertise is responsible for differences in own- versus cross-race facial 
recognition, the use of a non-expert object can provide a control condition against which 
to examine accuracy and response latency. Greebles (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) have been 
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used in numerous studies involving facial recognition, including assessment of brain 
activity. Greebles are computer-generated “creatures” that were designed to be able to 
compare the processing of faces to a set of novel object, and to examine how the 
processing changes as people became “Greeble experts.” An example of four Greebles is 
depicted in Figure 2. Greebles have some characteristics in common with faces: they are 
bilaterally symmetrical and, though they differ somewhat in shape and detail, the features 
of Greebles are always in the same configuration, as are facial features.  Greebles are 
very similar to one another, but have a gender, belong to a family, and with expertise, can 
be individuated. Greebles have names; both a family name and an individual name. For 
participants without previous exposure to Greebles, recognition attempts are difficult and 
depend largely on featural processing. As with other non-face objects, participants tend to 
focus on and try to remember the separate parts of the Greebles rather than using holistic 
processing. However, experiments have demonstrated that, with training, Greebles are 
processed like faces; as participants become Greeble experts, recognition is fast and easy, 
and depends largely on configural processing.  (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier, et al., 
1998).  
Neuroimaging studies show that Greeble experts utilize the part of the brain that 
is often designated as specialized for facial processing, the fusiform face area or FFA 
(Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Research utilizing other non-facial 
stimuli, such as birds and cars, have found similar FFA activation by experts with those 
objects. It is hypothesized that the FFA, rather than specialized for facial recognition, is 
utilized when fine distinctions need to be made between familiar objects; essentially, 
those things we are expert in distinguishing (Gauthier, et al., 2000; Rhodes, et al., 2004). 
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This research supports the idea the CRE may be due to a difference in expertise 
with same- versus other-race faces: Without training, Greebles, like cross-race faces, are 
processed featurally, or piece-meal: participants will attempt to remember aspects of the 
individual parts rather than the configural characteristics of the Greeble as a whole. 
However, with experience, Greebles are processed more holistically and in the same part 
of the brain that is generally associated with facial processing (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; 
Gauthier, et al., 1998).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Four Greebles 
 
In inversion tasks, reaction time often is used as a second measure of differences 
in task difficulty or participant skill. For example, the increase in reaction time for 
inverted faces (as compared to upright faces) is examined along with a drop in accuracy 
to assess the effect of the manipulation on the participant’s ability to complete the task 
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(i.e., the effect of preventing holistic processing). However, this use of the data fails to 
consider the contributions of task difficulty and response criterion. This is especially 
critical given that the application of a signal detection analysis to a CRE two-choice 
facial recognition task often reveals a lower response criterion for cross-race than own-
race faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). This is exhibited in, for example, a higher false 
alarm rate for Black faces that for White faces when the participant is White.  
Given the problems inherent with eyewitness identification, an increased tendency 
to simply pick a person if a lineup is cross-race, and to show greater caution if the lineup 
is own-race, is a matter of real concern. The difference in accuracy of White 
participants/witnesses in recognizing White faces over Black faces may be due to a 
relative inability to distinguish between faces of another race, a tendency to be more 
cautious when making a selection from a same race lineup, or both.  Models, such as the 
signal detection model (McNichol, 1972; Wickens, 2002) and the diffusion model 
(Ratcliff, 1978), can help parse whether differences in cross and same race facial 
recognition tasks are due primarily to discrimination ability (memory) or response 
criterion (decision), and to quantify the contribution of each. 
Reaction time and accuracy exist in a trade-off relationship that can confound the 
researcher’s ability to determine level of skill; while one participant may answer quickly 
but have low accuracy, another participant may answer more carefully, thereby 
increasing both reaction time and accuracy. Without examining both variables, there is no 
way to separate response conservativeness from subject ability, and, even examined 
together, the researcher cannot readily determine the relative contributions of skill (or 
task difficulty) and response conservativeness to a participant’s performance.  
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Models allow the researcher to estimate the latent variables that affect 
performance. The Ratcliff diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) utilizes the reaction time for 
accurate and inaccurate responses to estimate seven parameters, including the rate of 
information accumulation (quality of the memory), the amount of information required to 
make a decision (the criterion), and the nondecision (encoding, retrieval, and response) 
components of processing. While the Ratcliff diffusion model has been found to fit data 
well from a variety of two-choice reaction time tasks (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998), the 
fitting procedure is rather complex, which may discourage researchers from attempting to 
apply it to their data. It also requires entire reaction time distributions for incorrect 
decisions, so that in paradigms with a low error rate (such as many facial recognition 
tasks), the model will not function very well (Wagenmakers, van der Maas, & Grasman, 
2007). 
The EZ-Diffusion model (Wagenmakers, et al., 2007) is a simplified version of 
Ratcliff’s (1978) diffusion model. It estimates only three parameters: v, the drift rate 
(quality of information), a, boundary separation (response conservativeness), and Ter, 
non-decision time. The drift rate and boundary separation determine the decision time, 
while other processes such as stimulus encoding, memory access and retrieval, and 
response, etc. are combined into Ter. Although the cost of this simplification is less 
information, the remaining parameters are of those of primary interest. Applying the EZ 
diffusion model to the results of cross and same races facial inversion tasks allows for 
separate estimates of discrimination ability, response criterion, and the contributions of 




In sum, the use of the EZ Diffusion model can provide insight into the 
components underlying the differences in accuracy and reaction time for the six 
conditions created by the combinations of stimuli (White faces, Black faces, or Greebles) 
and photo orientation (upright or inverted at encoding). The inversion effect reveals 
differences in holistic versus featural processing; if the CRE is due to a lack of expertise 
in cross-race faces, leading to featural instead of holistic processing, cross-race faces and 
Greebles should share characteristics in terms of latent variables underlying performance. 
If differential expertise is not a factor in the CRE, the parameters that summarize the 
Greeble data should be relatively distinct from same and cross-race faces. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. A total of 103 University of Oklahoma students enrolled in an 
undergraduate psychology course participated in study. Participants earned research 
participation credit for the course in which they were enrolled, and were recruited 
through an online experiment management system that listed the available studies in need 
of subjects. Seventy-five of the participants identified themselves as White, non-
Hispanic, six identified as Black, non-Hispanic, four participants were White-Hispanic, 
four identified as Asian, two as multi-racial, one as Black-Hispanic, and eleven as Other. 
Although no participants were excluded on the basis of race or ethnicity, due to the 
constraints of the experiment and the demographic make-up of the student population at 
the University of Oklahoma, in which 75.3% of the students are White non-Hispanic, 
analysis of the data was restricted to White participants only.  Due to computer 




 Photographic Stimuli. During the experiment, participants viewed 80 computer 
images of photographs of college-age White and Black males of average weight (stimulus 
images courtesy of Dr. Chris Meissner, Investigative Interviewing Research Laboratory, 
University of Texas at El Paso, http://iilab.utep.edu/stimuli.htm). In order to eliminate 
any potential advantage due to a difference in physiognomic homogeneity (Chance, et al., 
1975), we selected only images of individuals with dark hair and brown eyes for both the 
Black and White stimulus sets.  
 For many years in the field of facial recognition, the standard procedure used 
identical photographs of each individual at study and at test (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986). 
Although this consistency serves as a control and allows researchers to explore how 
experimental variables affect recognition performance, it has been criticized for lacking 
ecological validity (Laughery, Alexander, & Lane, 1971). In reality, when asked to 
identify someone, a witness will not see the identical image of the person they saw 
previously; there may be a multitude of differences, including lighting, expression, age, 
clothing, angle, facial hair, and hair style. Recognition of one image of a person’s face is 
not necessarily the same as recognizing the person’s face (Ellis & Deregowski, 1981; 
Hay & Young, 1982). Research has shown that simply changing the pose or expression 
between study and test results in decreased recognition ability (Laughery, et al., 1971; 
Krouse, 1981). For example, Bruce (1982) found that participants did less well in 
recognizing faces that had changed in either angle or expression (compared to no change) 
between study and test; when both angle and expression changed, performance declined 
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even more. Due to our interest in examining facial recognition rather than image 
recognition, we utilized different images at study and at test. 
The stimuli included two images of each individual, one with the individual 
wearing street clothes and smiling, and the other with a neutral expression, wearing a 
gray sweatshirt. The images were cropped and digitally altered to depict only face and 
shoulders against a neutral background at a size of 270 x 360 pixels. No photographs of 
individuals with long hair, eyeglasses, jewelry, or distinctive facial hair were included. 
Any facial blemishes or marks were digitally removed. At encoding, participants saw the 
smiling image; at test, the image with the neutral expression and gray sweatshirt was 
presented. 
The photos had been rated previously by ten individuals for distinctiveness. 
Research has demonstrated that the uniqueness of a face positively impacts the 
participants’ recognition ability for that face (Shepherd, Gibling, & Ellis, 1991; 
Valentine, 1991). Distinctiveness impacts both hit and false alarm rate; participants tend 
to recognize previously seen distinctive faces better than typical faces, and, for distractor 
faces (that is, faces that are not presented during the encoding phase, but only at test), 
participants are less likely to mistakenly respond that the face was presented earlier if the 
face is distinctive rather than typical (Valentine, 1991; Wickham, Morris, & Fritz, 2000). 
Participants in this phase of the experiment saw each image and indicated how 
distinctive or memorable they found the face to be, on a scale of zero (very distinctive; 
“very easy to remember or pick out of a crowd”) to six (very typical; “very difficult to 
remember or pick out of a crowd”). No photo received a rating of zero or six, and the 
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typicality ratings for the White faces (M = 3.25, SD = .57) and Black faces (M = 3.37, SD 
= .72) were not found to be statistically different, paired t(9) = -.40, p = .696, two-tailed.  
In addition to the photographs of Black and White males, participants saw images 
of eighty Greebles (stimulus images courtesy of Dr. Michael J. Tarr, Center for the 
Neural Basis of Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, 
http://www.tarrlab.org/). The images were resized so that the Greebles were 
approximately the same size as the head and shoulder images of the males, and cropped 
to the same dimensions (250 x 360). In an attempt to prevent a floor effect in terms of 
accuracy of Greeble recognition, the participants viewed an image of ten Greebles (one of 
each gender from all five ‘families’) at the beginning of the experiment.  The images 
were labeled according to family and gender. Participants were instructed to examine the 
image of the different Greebles for 1 min.  
Equipment and software. The photographs and the questionnaire were presented 
via computer, utilizing the experimental software E-Prime 2.0.1.68  (Psychology 
Software Tools), allowing for randomization of the order of conditions presented (upright 
or inverted; Black, White, or Greeble), as well as the specific stimuli presented with each 
condition.   
 Procedure. After reading the informed consent form, participants were asked to 
read brief instructions about the stimuli, as well as the subsequent recognition test.  
Participants acknowledged readiness by pressing the space bar to begin the experiment. 
All participants completed four blocks. Each block consisted of two randomly 
ordered trials that differed as to the orientation of the encoding stimuli (inverted or 
upright). The test stimuli were always upright. Each of the four blocks included all three 
 
 30 
stimuli: faces of White males, faces of Black males, and images of Greebles. The 
encoding phase consisted of 15 randomly presented images, five each of Black males, 
White males, and Greebles, presented for 2 s each, with a 1 s fixation screen between 
each image.  
Following the encoding phase of each block, participants worked on a word 
search puzzle for 2 min. Following this task, participants viewed the instructions 
regarding the upcoming old-new recognition test. Participants could begin the test once 
they had completed reading the instructions. During the test phase, 30 images, all in an 
upright orientation, were presented sequentially. Ten images of each stimulus category 
(Black, White, Greeble) were presented; five had been presented during the encoding 
phase, five had not. Participants were instructed to press the letter ‘e’ if the object 
depicted in the image was old (one they had seen during the encoding phase), or to press 
the letter ‘i’ if the image was new (not presented during encoding). The order of blocks, 
inclusion of a particular image in any block, whether an image was presented at encoding 
and at test or at test only, as well as the order of presentation of images within a block, 
was completely randomized via E-Prime.  
Results and Discussion 
Data were analyzed using repeated-measures ANOVA and paired-samples t-tests 
(with Bonferroni adjustment). The design was a 3 (stimulus: White vs. Black vs. Greeble) 
x 2 (orientation: upright vs. inverted) within-subjects factorial. Seven dependent variables 
were examined: hit rate, hit rate reaction time, false alarm rate, false alarm rate reaction 
time, as well as the three parameters of the EZ Diffusion model, v (drift rate), a 
(boundary separation), and Ter (time needed to encode and respond at test). 
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For hit rate, there was a main effect for orientation of stimulus, F(1, 63) = 7.891, 
p = .006, partial η2 = .112, a main effect for race, F(2, 62) = 5.124, p = .009,  partial η2 = 
.142, and  a significant interaction effect of orientation and race, F(2, 62) = 3.255, p = 
.045, partial η2 = .095. The interaction effect prevents interpretation of the main effects, 
and because identifying the specific differences in the effects of inversion on the each set 
of stimuli is of great interest in this experiment, planned comparisons were conducted to 
further our understanding of the results. 
In the upright condition, there were no significant differences between the hit rate 
for White faces (M=.722, SD = .224) versus Black faces (M=.668, SD = .229), t(63) = 
1.5, p = ns. This is consistent with existing research which indicates that the CR effect is 
due, in large part, not to fewer CR correct identification, but rather to a higher false alarm 
rate (false positive identification) for cross-race faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001).The 
hit rate for Greebles (M=.584, SD = .260), was significantly lower than for White faces, 
t(63) = 3.521, p = .001. Although participants’ ability to correctly identify a previously 
seen Black face tended to be higher than the hit rate for Greebles, this difference did not 
reach the necessary level of significance, t(63) = 2.021, p = .047 4.  
In the inverted condition, there were no significant differences between White 
faces (M=.573, SD = .205), Black faces (M=.628, SD = .228), or Greebles (M=.556, SD = 
.238), ps > .077. 
The inversion effect is examined by looking at the drop in hit rate between the 
upright versus inverted condition. This is an indicator of whether the stimulus is 
processed holistically. A significant inversion effect indicates that holistic processing 
                                                




occurs in the upright condition, but that this is disrupted in the inverted condition. In 
examining the difference in hit rate for White faces, Black faces, and Greebles, only 
White faces showed a significant decline between the upright and inverted conditions, 
t(63) = 3.669, p = .001. Neither Black faces or Greebles had a significant inversion effect, 
ps >.318.  
The lack of an inversion effect for Black faces and Greebles indicates that a 
featural approach may have been used for both sets of stimuli, regardless of orientation, 
in contrast to the holistic process used for upright White faces. However, in the upright 
condition, White and Black faces did not differ in hit-rate, indicating that Black faces, 
while not processed with the same expertise as White faces, share some characteristics 
with White faces as well as with Greebles. Figure 3 presents a graphical depiction of hit 
rate and hit reaction time in the upright and inverted conditions for White faces, Black 
faces, and Greebles.  
 
Figure 3. Mean hit rate and hit reaction time (s) as a function of target stimuli and 




Turning to hit reaction time (RT), there was a main effect for stimulus F(2, 52) = 
5.679, p = .006, partial η2 = .179. Pairwise comparisons based on the estimated marginal 
means indicated that the hit RT was slower for Greebles (M = 1.630, SE = .084) than for 
Black faces (M = 1.376, SE = .054), p = .005.  The hit RT for White faces (M = 1.63, SE 
= .084) did not differ significantly from either Greebles or Black faces, ps < .193. 
Orientation did not show a main effect, F(1, 53) = 1.507, p = .225, partial η2 = .028, and 
there was no significant interaction, F(2, 52) = 1.088, p = .344, partial η2 = .040.  
Planned comparisons were conducted in order to compare the stimuli by 
orientation and to explore the effect of orientation on each set of stimuli. In the upright 
condition, there were no significant differences in hit RT between Black (M = 1.28, SD = 
.400) and White faces (M = 1.38, SE = .486), t(60) = 1.156, p = .252, and the difference 
in hit RT for White faces versus Greebles (M = 1.67, SD = .836) did not reach 
significance, t(59) = -2.432, p = .018. Participants tended to take more time to make a 
correct decision regarding a previously seen Greeble versus a Black face, t(58) = -3.34, p 
= .001.  
In the inverted condition, there were no significant differences in hit RT among 
the three sets of stimuli (White: M = 1.54, SD = .653, Black: M = 1.47, SD = .653, 
Greeble (M = 1.59, SD = .882), ps > .505.  
Although there appeared to be a slight inversion effects for both Black (t(59) = -
2.479, p = .016) and White (t(61) = -2.117, p = .038) faces, the differences in hit rate RT 
between upright versus inverted orientation were not statistically significant for either 
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category of stimulus, and there was no inversion effect for Greebles, t(59) = .282, p = 
.779.   
Overall, White and Black faces were similar in terms of hit RT. The longer 
reaction time for correct positive identifications of Greebles indicates that extra 
processing was necessary to make an accurate decision, and emphasizes the difficulty of 
the task.   
 A false alarm occurs when a participant signals that the face was presented 
during the encoding phase when it was not. Figure 4 depicts the false alarm rates for each 
condition and the corresponding false alarm RTs.  For false alarm rate, a main effect for 
orientation was found: the false alarm rate was significantly higher when the stimuli were 
inverted at encoding (M = .367, SE = .019) versus upright (M = .285, SE = .017), F(1,63) 
= 13.962, p =.0004, partial η2 = .181. There was also a significant main effect for 
stimulus F(2,62) = 14.832, p = .000005,  partial η2 = .324. Pairwise comparisons on the 
estimated marginal means (Bonferonni adjusted) revealed that White faces (M = .247, SE 
= .021) had a marginally lower false alarm rate than Black (M = .367, SE = .019) faces, p 
= .069, and that the false alarm rate for Greebles (M = .420, SE = .022) was significantly 
higher than for White faces, p = .0000004, or Black faces, p =.0004. There was no 
interaction effect between orientation and stimuli F(2,62) = 1.106, p = .337,  partial η2 = 
.034.  
Due to the interest in the inversion effect, we proceeded with the planned 
comparisons.  In the upright condition, the false alarm rate for White faces (M = .191, SD 
= .180) was significantly lower than for Black faces (M = .2875, SD = .228), t(63) = -
2.906, p = .005 and Greebles (M = .378, SD = .233), t(63) = -5.036, p =.000004. 
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Although the false alarm rate for Black faces trended towards being lower than the false 
alarm rate for Greebles, the difference did not reach significance, t(63) = -2.305, p = .024.   
In the inverted condition, the false alarm rate was significantly higher for 
Greebles (M = .463, SD = .216), than for White faces (M = .303, SD = .242), t(63) = -
3.832, p < .001, and Black faces (M = .334, SD = .255), t(63) = -3.358, p = .001, but 
there were no significant differences in false alarm rate between White faces and Black 
faces , t(63) = -.837, p = .406.  
In terms of an inversion effect, only White faces suffered a significant increase in 
false alarms when inverted as compared to upright presentation, t(63) = -3.320, p = .002. 
Although Greebles approached an inversion effect, it was not statistically significant, 
t(63) = -2.353, p = .022, and there was not a significant difference between the upright 
and inverted conditions for Black faces, t(63) = -1.269, p = .209. 
The finding that White faces differed from both Black faces and Greebles in the 
upright condition, and that the inversion effect again occurred only for White faces 
supports the idea that holistic encoding drives the same-race advantage. However, 
although White faces appear to be processed in a way that is distinct from Black faces 
and Greebles, Black faces do not appear to be processed in exactly the same way, or with 
similar accuracy, as Greebles. In the inverted condition, when the possibility of holistic 
encoding is disrupted, the false alarm rate for Greebles is significantly higher than both 
Black and White faces. If participants rely on features to make identifications in the 
inverted condition, it is possible that inverted Greeble features are not as salient or 




Figure 4. Mean false alarm rate and false alarm reaction time (s) as a function of target 
stimuli and orientation at test in Experiment 1. 
 
For false alarm RT, orientation led to a marginally significant main effect F(1, 20) 
=  4.034, p = .058, partial η2 = .168,  but stimulus did not, F(2, 19) =  1.668, p = .215, 
partial η2 = .149, and there was not an interaction effect F(2, 19) =  .344, p = .713, partial 
η2 = .035. The reaction time of false alarms was significantly longer in the inverted (M = 
1.307, SE =.097) versus upright (M = 1.541, SE =.127) orientation.  The planned 
comparisons yielded no significant findings.  
Longer response latency gives us some insight into the participants’ effort at a 
task; in the inverted condition, the need to process faces featurally rather than holistically 
takes more time and is less accurate. There were no significant differences between the 
different types of stimuli in either orientation; if White faces are processed holistically, 
whereas Black faces and Greebles are not, a main effect of stimulus (i.e., shorter RT for 
White faces) might be anticipated. However, the this measure assesses the response 
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latency for an incorrect response, and reaction time for accurate facial recognition has 
consistently been found to be faster than for incorrect responses (Sporer, 1993) . Dunning 
& Perretta (2002) argue that the potential accuracy of eyewitness identifications can be 
judged, in part, on the speed with which the decision is made. Accurate selections tend to 
be automatic, whereas incorrect identifications are characterized by a slow reaction time 
and effortful attempts to remember. Thus, it is possible that the participants, without 
feeling a sense of recognition at seeing a face, attempted to utilize more cognitive 
resources in an attempt to supply a correct response, but failed due to lack of memory 
strength.  False alarm responses necessarily occur when the previously viewed face is not 
present at test; this is a harder task than correctly realizing that a face has been seen. 
Essentially, a “target absent” condition, whether for a Black face, a White face, or a 
Greeble, may elicit an examination of features, since there is no true holistic match to 
memory or chance of recognition.  
Hit and false alarm rate are subject to influences from response criterion 
placement and do not allow for a full understanding of a person’s memory strength or 
skill. For example, if a participant responds “old” (previously seen) to every image 
presented at test, the resulting hit rate is 100%. This seems impressive, unless one notes 
that the false alarm rate is also 100%, since each new test face will also have been 
identified as having been seen during encoding. For a clearer understanding, 
discrimination ability must be decoupled from criterion. As discussed previously, the EZ-
Diffusion model measures these two components of the decision process with v (drift 
rate) and a (criterion), along with the non-decision component, Ter, which are depicted in 
Figure 5.  
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In looking at the parameters of the EZ diffusion model, v showed a significant 
interaction effect, F(2,62) = 4.741, p = .012, partial η2 = .133, as well as a main effect of 
orientation, F(1, 63) = 31.030, p = .000001 partial η2 = .330, and a main effect for 
stimulus, F(2, 126) = 23.199, p < .001, partial η2 = .395. Due to the significant interaction 
effect, the main effects cannot be interpreted. The planned comparisons were conducted 
to examine the different conditions.  
In the upright orientation, there was a marginally significant difference between 
White (M = .085, SD = .055) and Black faces (M = .060, SD = .052), t(63) = 2.653, p = 
.010, a significant difference between White faces and Greebles (M = .028, SD = .054), 
t(63) = 6.110, p < .001, and a significant difference between Black faces and Greebles, 
t(63) = 3.340, p < .001.  
In the inverted orientation, the drift rate for Black faces (M = .043, SD = .052) 
was significantly higher than for Greebles (M = .006, SD = .073), t(63) = 3.335, p < .001, 
but the difference between White faces (M = .032, SD = .047) and Greebles did not reach 
significance, t(63)=2.458, p = .017.   
For White faces, the drift rate was significantly higher in the upright condition 
than in the inverted condition, t(63) = 5.669, p = .001, but orientation did not result in 
significant difference in the drift rate for Black faces or for Greebles, ps > .062. Panel 1 
of Figure 3 shows that while inversion had a dramatic effect on the drift rate for White 
faces, neither Black faces nor Greebles were likewise affected.  Overall, the task of 
accurately judging whether or not a Greeble had been seen previously was difficult for 
participants, and even if it is the case that lack of expertise for cross-race faces is 
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responsible for the cross-race effect, participants would have more lifetime experience in 
recognizing Black faces than for recognizing Greebles.   
 
Figure 5. EZ diffusion model parameters (v, a, and ter) as a function of target stimuli and 
orientation at test in Experiment 1. 
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The parameter that assesses criterion placement is a. In a, the EZ diffusion model 
calculates how much information the participant requires before making a decision. If a 
participant has a liberal criterion, they will tend to reach their decision boundary quickly, 
potentially sacrificing accuracy for speed. If a participant is motivated to answer 
correctly, the decision boundaries are farther apart; the participant takes time to gather 
and assess information before responding.  
Boundary separation, or a, showed no main effect for orientation, F(1,63) =  .377, 
p = .542, partial η2 =.006, or interaction effect, F(2,62) =  1.374, p = .261, partial η2 
=.042, but there was a significant main effect for stimulus, F(2,62) =  4.846, p = .011, 
partial η2 =.135. Based on the marginal means, pairwise comparisons indicated that the 
wider boundary for White faces (M = .169, SE = .006) versus that for Black faces (M = 
.155, SE = .004) was not statistically significant, p = .084, and that the boundary for 
Greebles (M = .173, SE = .007) was significantly larger than for Black faces, p = .012.  
Planned comparisons for the stimuli in the upright condition indicated that the 
participants had a more conservative criterion for White faces (M = .171, SD = .057) than 
for Black faces (M = .148, SD = .044), t(63) = 2.720, p = .008. However, the response 
criterion for White faces and Greebles (M = .171, SD = .071 appeared to be very similar, 
t(63) = .101, p = .920, and although participants tended to use a more liberal criterion for 
Black faces than for Greebles, this difference was not statistically significant, t(63) = -
2.483, p = .016. 
In the inverted condition, there were no significant differences between the 
response criteria for White faces (M = .167, SD = .066), Black faces (M = .161, SD = 
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.046), or Greebles (M = .175, SD = .071), ps > .100.  In addition, none of the stimuli 
exhibited a significant inversion effect, ps > .084. 
Participants appear to have been motivated to respond correctly to White faces, 
and were willing to sacrifice a quick response in order to avoid making an error. This was 
less true for Black faces, and this replicates the usual findings in research of cross-race 
facial recognition; there appears to be less motivation to work to answer correctly for 
other- versus own-race faces. It is possible that this is an aspect of in-group/out-group 
behavior; the criterion is more liberal for those individuals of a different category or 
group than one’s own because inaccuracy is less important. The conservative response 
criterion for Greebles was not expected and cannot be well-explained by applying ideas 
about in-group/out-group behavior or cognitive disregard. It seems unlikely that 
participants shared any sense of affiliation with Greebles or intuited that Greebles held a 
position of power that might be of benefit to the participant in the future. Perhaps due to 
the novelty of the stimuli, as well as the similarity of Greebles to each other (at least, to 
the Greeble non-expert), participants realized that, in order to have a chance of 
responding correctly, care and time were necessary before making a decision.  
Ter, the time taken to encode the stimuli at test and to respond, did not 
demonstrate a main effect of orientation, F(1,63) =  .417, p = .521, partial η2 =.007, or an 
interaction effect, F(2,62) =  .011, p = .898, partial η2 =.000.  There was a main effect of 
stimulus, F(1,62) =  4.013, p = .023, partial η2 =.115. Pairwise comparisons on the 
estimated marginal means (Bonferroni adjusted) indicated that Ter was significantly 
shorter for White faces (M = .609, SE = .030) than for Black faces (M = .684, SE = .029), 
p = .048 or Greebles (M = .715, SE = .036), p = .036, but there were no significant 
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differences between Black faces and Greebles, p = 1.00. The planned comparisons 
revealed no significant differences, ps > .074. 
Ter was significantly shorter for White faces than for Black faces or Greebles, but 
Black faces and Greebles were not significantly different in terms of the non-decision 
time as measured by Ter. This similarity may reflect a lack of expertise in processing both 
types of stimuli, although given the disparity for most individuals in lifetime exposure to 
Greebles versus Black faces, a measure that reflected expertise or experience might be 
expected to show some difference between the two sets of stimuli. Contrary to our 
expectations, there was no inversion effect for White faces; if holistic processing 
facilitates encoding, the time taken to encode the photos of White faces should have 
increased in the inverted condition, when primarily configural, rather than holistic, 
processing is used. It could also be hypothesized that Ter reflects categorization of out-
group members.  In Sporer’s model, categorization occurs first in the encoding process 
and may interfere with the thoroughness and ease of the non-decision components of 
response time. In this scenario, it is possible that both Black faces and Greebles were, 
upon presentation, categorized rather than individuated, leading to a similar “hiccup” in 
response. The lack of an inversion effect supports Ter as capturing a “categorization 
effect” rather than expertise. However, there is no way to establish that the similarity in 
Ter for Greebles and Black faces is due to the same process. For example, categorization 
may increase Ter for Black faces, while lack of experience is responsible for the increase 
in Greeble Ter.  
Overall, the cross race effect was found: For upright orientation, participants had 
a lower false alarm rate, higher accuracy (as measured by v), a higher response criterion 
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(a), and a faster latency for components of encoding, retrieval, and response (Ter) for 
White faces than for Black faces. Recognizing Greebles, even in the upright condition, 
was fairly difficult for most participants. Performance, as measured in false alarm rate 
and v, reflected poor accuracy for Greebles. Participants did try to answer correctly, as 
evidenced by the conservative response criterion as measured by a.  
Inversion has a disproportionate effect on White faces over both Black faces and 
Greebles in terms of hit rate and v (drift rate). A lack of inversion effect is hypothesized 
to be related to relatively greater featural, instead of configural, processing; inversion 
disrupts this process for White faces, but, because upright Black faces and Greebles are 
not processed in this manner, inversion does not lead to a marked drop in performance for 
either one. In terms of v, as well as false alarm rate, Black faces were more similar to 
Greebles than to White faces, though the graphs indicate that Black faces may occupy a 
middle ground between the other two stimuli.   
If expertise in same- versus cross-race faces is responsible for the cross-race 
effect, this would be reflected in a similarity in the response variables between Black 
faces and Greebles as compared to White faces. The findings of Experiment 1 provide 
some support for the idea that expertise is a factor in the disparity between own-race and 
cross-race recognition. However, it is possible that, while lack of expertise in recognizing 
Greebles affected the response variables in terms of the measures of accuracy and RT, 
Black faces might be affected in similar ways by either lack of expertise or increased 
categorization, or both. Experiment 1 could not be used to examine the contributions of 
categorization or cognitive disregard to the cross-race effect, nor did it reveal information 
about how different levels of expertise might affect cross-race facial recognition.   
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A second experiment, incorporating both race and categorization, was developed. 
In addition, we sought to measure participants’ interracial contact, as well as implicit 
attitudes about Black people, to examine the influence of these factors on cross-race 
facial recognition ability.   
Experiment 2 
In order to examine the role of in-group/out-group categorization in facial 
recognition, we utilized a paradigm similar to that of Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg 
(2007), in which facial recognition for own- versus rival university students was tested. 
By identifying the images as members of the participants’ university or students at 
another university, Bernstein et al. (2007) established that social categorization alone 
could lead to differences in facial recognition, but used images of white males only. In 
Experiment 2, the inclusion of both cross-race (Black and White faces) and cross-
university (the faces identified as students of the University of Oklahoma or of a rival 
university) allowed for a comparison of the cross-race effect to the cross-category effect.  
In order to further test the expertise hypothesis, level of cross-race interaction was 
assessed via a self-report. If the own race advantage develops as a result of contact with 
same-race individuals, the difference between own and cross-race identification should 
diminish with increased interracial contact.  Strong underlying negative stereotypes about 
Black people may correspond to increased levels of depersonalization of African 
Americans. According to Sporer’s (2001b) theory, out-group members are less well 
recognized because they are first categorized, while in-group members are individuated. 
Attitudes about individuals of a different race and cross-race interaction may well be 
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intertwined: negative beliefs lead to limited and superficial contact; increased interaction 
diminishes the tendency to stereotype (Shepherd, 1971).  
Previous research in this area has relied primarily on self-reports, which are 
vulnerable to measurement reactivity, particularly when the questions involve potentially 
sensitive topics such as prejudicial beliefs. It is preferable, though often not possible, to 
use a measure that is not entirely within the participants’ control (Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998). Instead of asking questions about beliefs and stereotypes, the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) utilizes response time. Developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and 
Schwartz (1998), the IAT has been used to examine the positive and negative 
associations of many different target concepts. Though somewhat controversial (Blanton, 
Jaccard, Gonzales, & Christie, 2006; van Ravenzwaaij, van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 
2011), the IAT was of interest due to its purported ability to assess attitudes about race 
that might not be revealed in a self-report, whether due to a participant’s desire to present 
him/herself in a more positive light (i.e., without prejudiced attitudes) or simply because 
s/he is unaware of some of the negative associations s/he may have about people of a 
different race.  
There are two tasks in the IAT, a concept task and an attribute task. For the 
concept task, the participant views exemplars of two distinct target concepts (“insects” 
and “flowers”) and categorizes them into the appropriate group. For example, a 
participant may be told to press the letter ‘e’ if an image of a flower appears and press ‘i’ 
if the image depicts an insect. During the second phase, the attribute task, the participant 
classifies attributes into categories (“positive” or “negative”).  As an example, if 
instructed to press the letter ‘e’ for all positive attributes and the letter ‘i’ for negative 
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attributes, upon reading a word with a pleasant meaning or connotation (e.g., “happy”, 
“peace”) the participant should press ‘e’, and press ‘i’ if the word means something 
unpleasant (“rotten, “war”). During the test phase of the IAT, the concept and attribute 
tasks are performed in alternation, using the same response keys. Thus, the same response 
key (for example, the letter ‘e’) may be needed to classify the picture of a daisy into the 
category “flower” and to identify the word “beautiful” as “positive,” whereas ‘i’ is 
mapped onto both the category “insect” and the attribute “negative.” Alternatively, the 
category “flower” could be paired with the attribute “negative,” and “insect” with 
positive. After the first test block, the response key mapping and category/attribute pair 
are re-paired (if, in test block 1, “flower” was paired with “negative,” in test block 2, 
flower will be paired with “positive”), and a second test block begins. For most people, 
the task will be easier if the same response key is mapped onto “flower” and “positive” 
than “insect” and “positive” because there is a stronger association between the former 
category and attribute.  
The IAT uses response latencies and error rates to examine the differential 
association of two concepts with the attributes; compatible mapping (e.g., flowers and 
positive) will result in faster and more accurate responses than incompatible mapping. 
Simply put, the mean reaction time of combined incompatible trials is compared to the 
combined mean reaction time of the compatible trials; this is the “IAT effect.” 
Theoretically, the more incompatible a concept is with an attribute, the slower and more 
error prone the responses. The individual that struggles more when images of White 
people are paired with negative words and images of Black people are paired with 
positive words is hypothesized to have stronger negative stereotypes about Black people 
 
 47 
than a person with a smaller difference in reaction time between the different pairings of 
race to attribute.  
Method 
 Participants. Participants were students (N=80) at the University of Oklahoma 
who were enrolled in an undergraduate psychology class. The participants received 
research participation credit for the class in which they were enrolled. Sixty-three of the 
participants identified themselves as White, non-Hispanic, two identified as Black, non-
Hispanic, five participants were White, Hispanic, four identified as Asian, and six as 
Other. As in Experiment 1, only the data from the White participants were included in the 
analysis.  
 Materials.  
Photographic Stimuli. The computer images of White and Black males used in 
Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. However, instead of a white background, the 
faces were displayed against either a maroon background with the caption “University of 
Oklahoma” below the faces, or against a dark blue background with “Boise State 
University” as the caption.5 As for Experiment 1, the faces used in the encoding session 
bore a happy expression and wore street clothes; in the test component of the experiment, 
the males had neutral expressions and wore gray sweatshirts.  The background color and 
caption were consistent across encoding and test.  
 Social Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ). The SEQ, developed by John Brigham 
(1993), is a 67-item questionnaire and was used to assess the frequency and the quality of 
cross-race interactions of the participants. Different types (personal, business, social, 
                                                
5 In the football season preceding the experiment, the University of Oklahoma lost to Boise State 
University at the Fiesta Bowl. 
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public) and outcomes (unpleasant/pleasant; costly/beneficial) of cross-race contact can be 
measured with the SEQ, including past and present levels of interaction. Participants that 
self-identified as Black were asked about their quantity and quality of contact with White 
people. All other participants (White, Asian, Hispanic, Other) answered questions about 
their interactions with Black people. For any participant that identified as bi-racial (Black 
and White), the version of the SEQ to be administered was decided by a coin-toss. Only 
the results from White participants regarding their level and type of interaction with 
Black people are included.    
 Implicit Association Test (IAT). We administered the Racial (Black/White) IAT, 
developed by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998).  This version of the IAT 
consists of ten black and white photos each of White and Black males and females. 
During a trial, participants viewed either an image of a White person or a Black person, 
or one of 16 words, eight of which were positive or pleasant (“love,” “joy”), and eight of 
which were negative or unpleasant (“hate,” “horrible”). Critical trials included 
compatible/congruent blocks6 in which White images were paired with positive words 
and Black images were paired with negative words.  Participants were instructed to press 
a letter if the stimulus was an image of a White person or a positive word, and a different 
letter if the presented image was a Black person or a negative word.  In the 
incompatible/incongruent blocks, White images were paired with negative words and 
Black images were paired with positive words. The order of these critical blocks and 
response key mappings were counterbalanced between subjects. For each task, stimuli 
appeared one at a time in the center of the computer screen, and participants pressed the 
                                                
6 The terms compatible/congruent and incompatible/incongruent reflect the theoretical basis of the IAT and 
are derived from the use of the terms by the developers of the IAT. The terms were never used during at 
any point during the administration of the IAT to the participants.  
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‘e’ key or ‘i’ key on the computer keyboard to classify the stimuli as quickly and 
accurately as possible into the appropriate categories. All pictures were placed against a 
black background and sized to 300 x 450 pixels. 
Equipment and software. The photographs and the questionnaire were presented 
via computer, utilizing the experimental software E-Prime 2.0.1.68  (Psychology 
Software Tools), which allows for randomization of the order of conditions presented 
(upright and upside-down; Black and White), as well as the photographs presented with 
each condition.  
 Procedure. Participants first read the informed consent form. After reading some 
brief instructions about the facial images they were about to see and the subsequent 
recognition test, the first encoding sequence began. All participants completed 2 blocks 
consisting of two randomly ordered trials each. The trials varied by the orientation of the 
encoding stimuli (inverted or upright), while the test stimuli was always upright.  
 During encoding, participants saw 12 facial images, six each of White and Black 
males. For each racial category, half were depicted as being affiliated with OU, while the 
other three were affiliated with BSU. University affiliation was randomly assigned via 
computer for each participant. The images displayed on the computer monitor for 2 s 
each, with a 1 s fixation screen before each image. Immediately following the encoding 
session, participants were instructed regarding the upcoming recognition test, and, as in 
Experiment 1, were asked to press ‘e’ if they recognized the face as one that had been 
presented during encoding, or ‘i’ if it had not been displayed previously. Participants 
were informed that a change in clothing or facial expression was forthcoming, and that 
their recognition decision should be based on the individual, not on the characteristics of 
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the images themselves. Each test session consisted of 24 faces, half of which had been 
present previously and half of which were new. The new faces were divided evenly into 
the categories of Black and White, OU and BSU, so that, in total, participants saw 12 
Black faces, 6 OU affiliated, 6 BSU affiliated, and 12 White faces, 6 each affiliated with 
OU or BSU. If a face had been presented during the encoding session, university 
affiliation was the same at encoding and at test.  
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, repeated-measures ANOVA and paired comparisons (with 
Bonferroni adjustment) were used to test for significant differences. The design was a 2 
(stimulus: White males vs. Black males) x 2 (orientation at encoding: upright vs. 
inverted) x 2 (university affiliation: OU vs. BSU) within-subjects factorial. In total, 7 
dependent variables were examined: hit rate, false alarm rate, hit rate RT, false alarm RT, 
as well as the EZ diffusion parameters of v (drift rate), a (boundary separation) and Ter 
(time for encoding and response).  
Orientation of stimuli led to a main effect for hit rate, F(1, 62) = 20.990, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .253 , demonstrating an overall inversion effect: participants were less 
accurate at correctly identifying previously presented faces when the test stimuli were 
inverted (M  = .589, SD =  .183) than when the stimuli were presented upright at test (M  
= .691, SD =  .151).  Stimuli at encoding were always presented upright. No significant 
effects were found for race or university, and there were no interaction effects. However, 
in order to gain a better understanding of potential trends in the different categories of 
stimuli, we proceeded with the planned comparisons. Eight paired t-tests were conducted: 
in the upright condition, performance for White OU-affiliated versus White BSU-
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affiliated images, Black OU versus Black BSU affiliated faces, White OU versus Black 
OU images, and White BSU versus Black BSU faces. In addition, the inversion effect 
was examined through paired t-tests for the upright versus inverted condition of each 
race/university category. A significant inversion effect was found for White OU-affiliated 
images; the hit rate for upright White OU faces (M  = .737, SD =  .241) was significantly 
larger than the hit rate for inverted White OU faces (M  = .587, SD =  .319), t(62) = 
3.297, p = .002.  The inversion effect for White BSU faces approached, but did not 
achieve, significance (Upright: M  = .686, SD =  .232; Inverted: M  = .578, SD =  .274), 
t(62) = 2.739, p = .0087. Inversion disrupted the holistic processing that occurred for 
White faces, particularly White OU-affiliated faces. As in Experiment 1, Black faces did 
not show a significant inversion effect, indicating that holistic processing is not used for 
upright Black faces. Figure 6 depicts the hit rate and hit reaction time.  
For hit reaction time, orientation at encoding had a significant effect, F(1, 52) = 
11.320, p = .001, partial η2 = .179.  Accurate positive identifications were made more 
quickly in the upright condition (M  = 1.266, SD =  .444) than when the stimuli were 
inverted (M  = 1.451, SD =  .532). No other significant effects were detected. In general, 
hits in the upright condition were achieved relatively quickly, whereas, in the inverted 
condition, a more effortful and time-consuming process was needed. This points to the 
use of a featural, rather than holistic, approach for inverted images. Paired comparisons 
were again conducted; the hit reaction time for Black OU-affiliated faces was shorter in 
the upright condition (M  = 1.255, SD =  .539) versus the inverted condition (M  = 1.523, 
SD =  .566), t(61) = 3.539, p = .001. For Black BSU-affiliated faces, the difference in 
                                                




reaction time between the upright (M  = 1.281, SD =  .558) versus inverted (M  = 1.513, 
SD =  .592) conditions indicated a possible trend that participants took less time in the 
upright condition, but this did not reach the necessary level of significance, t(58) = 2.691, 
p = .009.  
 
Figure 6. Mean hit rate and hit reaction time (s) as a function of target stimuli and 
orientation at test in Experiment 2. 
For false alarm rate, there was a main effect of orientation, F(1, 62) = 47.020, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .431. Orientation and race showed a significant interaction effect, F(1, 
62) = 4.512, p = .038, partial η2 = .068. Comparisons of White versus Black faces within 
each orientation revealed that Black faces (M  = .365, SD =  .222) had a higher false 
alarm rate than White faces (M  = .265, SD =  .151) in the upright orientation only. 
Contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences due to university 
affiliation. The planned comparisons showed a significant inversion effect for White OU-
affiliated faces (Upright: M  = .248, SD =  .205, Inverted: M  = .470, SD =  .305), t(62) = 
5.116, p < .001 and White BSU-affiliated faces, (Upright: M  = .283, SD =  .211, 
Inverted: M  = .460, SD =  .270), t(62) = 4.209, p < .001,  but Black faces did not suffer 
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an inversion effect in terms of false alarm rate. As in Experiment 1, when compared to 
the false alarm rate for White faces, participants were more likely to incorrectly indicate 
that a Black face had been seen previously. However, the recognition advantage for 
White faces disappeared in the inverted condition, supporting the hypothesis that, in part, 
the cross-race effect is due to holistic processing for White faces. 
Examining false alarm reaction time (RT), there was a main effect for race F(1, 
25) = 8.307, p = .008, partial η2 = .249. The false alarm response latency for Black faces 
(M = 1.701, SD = .510) was longer than the false alarm response latency for White faces 
(M  = 1.454, SD =  .480). Neither orientation nor university affiliation showed a main 
effect, and there were no significant interactions. None of the paired comparisons yielded 
significant differences.  A graphical display of false alarm rate and false alarm response 
time is presented in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Mean hit rate and hit reaction time (s) as a function of target stimuli and 




There was a main effect of orientation for v, F(1, 62) = 37.642, p < .001, partial η2 
= .378. The interaction between orientation and race was significant, F(1,62) = 13.336, p 
=.001, partial η2 = .177.  Based on the estimated marginal means, the drift rate for White 
faces (M  = .067, SD = .040) was higher than for Black faces (M  = .044, SD = .040) in 
the upright, but not inverted, condition. University affiliation showed no main effect, nor 
was there an interaction effect for university and orientation. The planned follow-up 
comparisons indicated that, in the upright condition, participants performed significantly 
better when the image was of a White OU-affiliated face (M  = .076, SD =  .052) versus a 
Black OU-affiliated face (M  = .046, SD =  .055), t(62) = 3.433, p = .001. Significant 
inversion effects were found for White OU faces (Upright: M  = .076, SD =  .052, 
Inverted: M  = .020, SD =  .070), t(62) = 5.70, p < .001,  and White BSU faces (Upright: 
M  = .059, SD =  .053, Inverted: M  = .023, SD = .044), t(62) = 3.835, p < .001.  
The EZ diffusion measure of criterion, a, showed a main effect of orientation, 
F(1,62) = 4.196, p = .045, partial η2 = .063, and an interaction effect of orientation and 
race, F(1,62) = 5.407, p = .023, partial η2 = .080. Participants had a higher criterion for 
White faces (M  = .175, SD = .063) than for Black faces (M  = .158, SD = .048) in the 
upright condition, but there was not a significant difference in the inverted condition. 
There were no other significant differences, contrary to our prediction that participants 
would have a lower criterion for BSU-affiliated faces than for OU-affiliated faces.  
For the parameter Ter, there were no significant main or interaction effects, and 
none of the planned comparisons were significant. Unlike Experiment 1, race did not 
have a significant impact on Ter.  Likewise, university affiliation did not appear to 
influence the time needed by participants to encode and respond to the stimuli. This was 
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contrary to our hypothesis that, as a potential measure of categorization, Ter would be 
larger for Black faces and for BSU-affiliated images. 
 
Figure 8. EZ diffusion model parameters (v, a, and ter) as a function of target stimuli and 
orientation at test in Experiment 2. 
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To determine if cross-race contact and prejudice had an effect on cross-race 
recognition performance we examined the relationship between the items on the Social 
Experience Questionnaire, the results of the Implicit Association Test, and the cross-race 
differences for v, a, and Ter. In order to calculate the cross-race effects, the mean 
responses for the Black stimuli were subtracted from the mean responses for the White 
stimuli for each participant. Due to the number of interaction effects between race and 
orientation, only the upright condition was used in the calculations. Thus, the three 
variables included in the analysis were vupright_White-upright_Black, aupright_White-upright_Black, and 
Ter upright_White- upright_Black.  
The 56 SEQ items were subjected to an orthogonal factor analysis (varimax 
rotation) that yielded six meaningful factors. The first factor, labeled public/social, 
consisted of contact with Blacks in public or social non-intimate settings. It contained 8 
items (factor loadings of .40 or above) regarding how pleasant and how beneficial past 
interactions were with Blacks in public settings and personal– nonintimate settings, as 
well as expectations for future interactions in these settings (eigenvalue = 5.98, 14.2% of 
total variance). The second factor, past contact, consisted of 8 items that inquired as to 
the level of contact with Blacks in elementary, middle, and high school, the percentage of 
Black people in the neighborhood in which one grew up, as well as level of past 
interaction overall, in public settings, and in personal, non-intimate settings (eigenvalue = 
4.94, 11.8% of total variance accounted for). The third factor, which we labeled present 
contact, included 9 items that asked about the extent of present contact with Blacks on 
campus, in the dorms, at work, number of Black friends (eigenvalue = 3.58, 8.2% of 
variance). The fourth factor, labeled personal/intimate, contained five questions regarding 
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the pleasantness and benefit of past interactions, as well as expected pleasantness and 
benefit of future interactions, in intimate settings (eigenvalue = 3.45, 38.2% of variance). 
The fifth factor, business, consisted of four items about the pleasantness and benefit of 
past interactions with Blacks in business settings (eigenvalue = 2.43, 5.8% of variance). 
The sixth factor, past friends, contained three items about the number of Black friends in 
elementary, middle and high schools (eigenvalue=1.94, 4.6% of variance).  
The IAT scores were derived following the D scoring algorithm as recommended 
by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Response latencies were calculated from the 
onset of the trial until the participant made a correct response. Any response latencies less 
than 400 ms or greater than 10,000 ms were removed. IAT scores can range from -2.00 to 
+2.00. According to Greenwald et al. (1998), a score of -2.00 (a result of high accuracy 
and quick response time when the pairings are Black/positive and White/negative, as well 
as low accuracy and long reaction time for Black/negative and White/positive pairings) 
indicates a very strong preference for Black people and suggests a negative attitude, 
conscious or unconscious, about White people. A score of +2.00 corresponds to a strong 
preference for white people and a negative attitude about Black people.  
Table 1 displays the correlations between the dimensions of the SEQ and the IAT. 
There were three significant correlations: interracial contact and experience in public 
setting correlated positively with cross-race contact in business settings, a positive 
correlation was found between level of cross-race experience the personal domain and 
past interracial contact, and level of present cross-race contact was positively correlated 
with the items involving past interracial friendship.  Contrary to our hypothesis, level of 
bias or prejudice, as measured by the IAT, did not correlate significantly with any of the 
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interracial experience dimensions from the SEQ. This finding mirrors other studies that 
have failed to demonstrate a relationship between cross-race experience and prejudice. 
The effect has been shown to be small, so it is possible that the IAT is not sensitive 
enough to capture the differences in levels of prejudice, as the majority of White 
participants tend to score relatively high on the IAT.  
Table 1 
Correlations Between Measures of Cross-Race Experience and the Implicit 
Association Test for Race 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
1. Personal  0.24 0.14 0.30 * 0.10 -0.03 -0.09  
2. Public   0.55 ** -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.13  
3. Business    -0.13 -0.07 -0.11 0.04  
4. Past     0.22 -0.15 -0.17  
5. Present      0.39 ** -0.26  
6. Past Friends       0.44  
7. IAT         
 Note. ns = 46-64.  IAT = Implicit Association Test. Personal, public, business, past, 
present, and past friends represent six factors derived from the Social Experience 
Questionnaire (SEQ). 
 * p < .05.    ** p<.01 
 
Correlational analyses were performed on the measures of cross-race recognition 
(v, a, and Ter) and the results of the SEQ and IAT. The results are displayed in Table 2.   
Table 2 
Correlations Between Measures of Cross-Race Experience and Cross-Race 
Recognition Performance 
  Personal Public Business Past Present Past 
Friends 
IAT  
ter UW-UB -0.12 -0.29 * 0.08  0.12  -0.05  -0.11  -0.14  
a UW-UB 0.88 0.07  -0.08  -0.02  0.22  0.11  0.06  
VUW-UB 0.08 -0.03  -0.14  0.20  0.44 ** 0.62 ** 0.08  
  Note. ns = 46-64.  IAT = Implicit Association Test. Personal, public, business, past, 
present, and past friends represent six factors derived from the Social Experience 
Questionnaire (SEQ).  




A negative correlation was found between the cross-race experience in the public 
domain and Ter, the time taken to encode and respond to the stimuli at test. The 
participants that had a large cross-race difference in Ter tended to have a low score in 
terms interracial contact in public settings. This was an unexpected finding; although 
increased interracial contact was expected to potentially lower Ter due to increased ease 
of processing, we did not expect that this would occur for the public domain only. The 
measure of discrimination, or v, correlated positively with the SEQ dimensions of present 
interracial contact, and cross-race friendships in the past. This is contrary to our 
prediction that increased cross-race experience would correspond to a smaller cross-race 
effect in recognition ability. Participants that reported high levels of interracial contact in 
the present and in past friendships actually tended to have a higher cross-race effect, 
indicating that they were able to accurately identify White faces much better than Black 
faces. Contrary to our hypothesis, the measure of criterion, a, did not show any 
significant correlations with the SEQ factors. Level of cross-race contact did not 
correspond to a difference in caution in terms of deciding whether or not a White versus a 
Black face had been seen before.  
As in Experiment 1, the cross-race effect was found. Recognition performance 
was better for White faces versus Black faces for false alarm rate, v, and a. In general, 
inversion led to disruption of the processing of White faces, and not Black faces, as 
indicated in the response variables of hit rate, false alarm rate, v and a. Unlike the study 
by Bernstein et al. (2007), in which a significant cross-university effect was found, 
university affiliation had very little impact on accuracy or response time in Experiment 2.  
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The findings support the contribution of expertise rather than categorization in the CRE; 
the cross-category manipulation failed to yield significant results, allowing for little 
comparison between the CRE and the out-group effect. This could be because race is a 
more salient characteristic and therefore supersedes other categories. Thus, when 
presented with Black and White faces for each university affiliation, participants 
categorized the Black faces and individuated the White faces.  
Other researchers have found evidence for this idea. Shriver, Young, Hugenberg, 
Bernstein, and Lanter (2008) found that facial recognition was worse for White faces 
presented in impoverished versus wealthy contexts. In a series of experiments, they found 
support for a social cognitive rather than a perceptual expertise model of the CRE. 
However, although out-group categorization did result in a decline in recognition for 
White faces, Black faces were poorly recognized regardless of socioeconomic status. 
Likewise, in an experiment similar to the second experiment presented in this paper, 
images were affiliated with either the same or other-university; recognition dropped for 
White faces, but not for Black faces. Thus, while this research appears to make a strong 
case for the contribution of categorization on the CRE, it does not, as the researchers 
admit, preclude the possibility that expertise also plays a role in the CRE, although 
Shriver et al. (2008) suggest that, instead, the tendency to categorize Black people as out-
group members was too strong to be ameliorated by in-group status in terms of wealth or 
university affiliation. Their stance is supported by research in social cognition that 
demonstrates the power of certain characteristics such as sex, race, and age to 
spontaneously elicit categorization and to persist as the dominant category across 
contexts (Brewer, 1988; Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992). However, such research 
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can still coexist logically with the argument that a lack of expertise contributes to the 
CRE; indeed, they are complementary. Out-group categorization on the basis of race 
appears to be, to some extent, spontaneous and involuntary. This tendency, then, may 
further impede the development of expertise, even with greater contact, and this lack of 
expertise may only compound the strength of the tendency to categorize (Judd & Park, 
1988). 
General Discussion 
Taken together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 support the importance of 
expertise in the CRE. Black faces were more similar to Greebles than to White faces on 
many of the measures assessed in Experiment 1. A significant cross-race effect, but not a 
cross-category effect, was found in Experiment 2. Inversion affected the processing of 
White faces, but did not significantly impact the identification accuracy of Black faces or 
Greebles, and the inversion effect was not impacted by university affiliation.  
However, these results are not inconsistent with the possibility that categorization 
of out-group members interferes with facial recognition and contributes to the CRE, 
particularly in light of current research in this field that illuminates the importance of 
category saliency.   For example, Hehman, Mania, and Gaertner (2009) induced 
categorization by either race or university affiliation by spatially organizing the 
presentation of eight faces. When race was made salient, a significant cross-race effect 
was found, and there was no cross-university effect. However, when university affiliation 
was the salient category, participants were significantly more accurate at identifying own- 
versus other-university faces, and there was no cross-race effect. While these intriguing 
results bolster arguments for the role of social categorization rather than perceptual 
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expertise in the CRE, they still cannot discount the contribution of the latter. Scrutiny of 
the different manipulations reveals that the CRE was eliminated primarily through a 
reduction in own-race recognition in the university manipulation rather than due to an 
increase in ability to recognize cross-race faces.  Thus, it appears there is a complex 
interplay between expertise and categorization.  
Susa, Meissner, and de Heer (2010) used path analysis to examine the influences 
of cross-race contact, racial attitudes, perceptual discrimination, racial categorization, and 
recollection on cross-race facial recognition. They suggest a cascade of direct and 
indirect effects, beginning with the social psychological influences (i.e., level of 
interracial contact and racial attitudes), to aspects of perception and working memory 
(perceptual discrimination and categorization), and the contributions recollection and 
recognition, which are higher-level cognitive processes associated with long-term 
memory. Susa, et al. (2010) assessed participants on four different tasks: level of 
interracial experience and racial attitudes; speed and accuracy of racial categorization; 
ability to discriminate a previously seen face from a set of 2, 4, 6, or 8 distracter faces; 
and, pitting the participants’ capacity to use recollection rather than relying on a sense of 
familiarity, correct identification of faces presented during the study phase when 
randomly presented in a sequential array of both novel faces and faces that had 
previously been presented in the test phase.  
Their findings were consistent with previous research: participants categorized 
other-race faces more accurately and faster than own-race faces, perceptual 
discrimination and recognition memory were better for own race faces, and participants 
were more likely to commit a “repetition error” for cross-race faces, erroneously 
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identifying faces presented previously in the test phase as faces that had been presented in 
the study phase.  
Separate path models were estimated for own and cross-race faces. The results 
indicated that while facial recognition performance for own-race faces was due primarily 
to the higher-level cognitive processes of familiarity and recognition, racial 
categorization and perceptual discrimination accounted for cross-race recognition 
performance. Also, in the cross-race model, greater interracial contact was associated 
with a lower occurrence of the repetition error and longer categorization latency was 
linked with better discrimination and recognition abilities. Perceptual discrimination 
scores predicted recognition ability and repetition errors. A comparison of the two 
models revealed two significant differences: participants were more likely to commit the 
“repetition error” for cross-race faces versus own-race faces, and a more positive 
association between quick categorization and lower accuracy was found for cross-race 
faces.  
These findings indicate that higher level processes account for differences in 
recognition performance for own-race faces more than for cross-race faces, ostensibly 
because the more conscious, effortful process of recollection relies on a strong and 
accurate memory, which is not as available for cross-race faces. Also, the results 
emphasize the role of categorization in the CRE. The easier it was for a participant to 
categorize, as indicated by a shorter latency, the lower the recognition accuracy, which 
suggests that the process of out-group categorization interferes with the encoding process, 
perhaps because individuating features are ignored. Future research in this field will need 
to be attentive to such multifaceted contributions to the CRE. 
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Level of interracial contact and implicit attitudes about Black people were not 
well established as influential factors in the CRE in Experiment 2. Previous findings 
about increased contact and racial attitudes are often inconsistent and somewhat 
contradictory, and it is possible that the measurements used were not sensitive enough to 
capture real differences. It may be injudicious to expect that attending school with a few 
African American children or having positive experiences with Black people in public 
settings would begin to approach the level of opportunity for developing the expertise for 
White faces, a complex proficiency garnered over a lifetime with innumerable faces and 
types of contact. In addition, relative lack of variety within the sample regarding levels of 
contact and implicit attitudes weakened our ability to detect the influence of these factors 
on cross race facial recognition.  A more diverse population, with greater variance in 
levels of interaction and beliefs, would greatly enhance this sort of study, as well as allow 
the inclusion of other races.  
The inversion effect was found for White faces, but not for own-university faces, 
lending credence to the idea that expertise leads to holistic processing, which facilitates 
recognition. However, due to the issue of race saliency, the results cannot disprove or 
support the possibility that out-group categorization would disrupt holistic processing. An 
experiment that examined the effect of inversion on in-group versus out-group members 
might yield findings that could address this question.  
Another avenue for future research is the potential change in response patterns as 
one gains expertise. Training in Greebles appears to lead to an inversion effect (Rossion, 
Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & Crommelick, 2002); researchers speculate that this is 
evidence of the holistic processing that comes into play with increased skill in 
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recognizing and individuating members of a group. In addition, neurological studies 
demonstrate that, with sufficient training, Greeble recognition takes place in the FFA, the 
area known to be active during facial recognition (Rossion, Gauthier, Goffaux, Tarr, & 
Crommelinck, 2002). By testing participants on facial (White and Black) and Greeble 
recognition before, during, and after engaging in training in Greeble recognition, an 
assessment of the response variables and EZ diffusion parameters could reveal 
information about the development of expertise.  
The study of cross-race facial recognition is increasingly becoming a complicated 
and fascinating endeavor, one that holds important ramifications for the legal field, but 
also informs us about the impact of group membership, motivation, and context, as well 
as the development of expertise. Determining how the factors coact requires sophisticated 
experiments and analysis; through careful inquiry, researchers may be able to better 
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